To establish the correctness of some software w.r.t. its formal speci cation is widely recognized as a di cult task. A rst simpli cation is obtained when the semantics of an algebraic speci cation is de ned as the class of all algebras which correspond to the correct realizations of the speci cation. A software is then declared correct if it corresponds to some algebra of this class. We approach this goal by de ning an observational satisfaction relation which is less restrictive than the usual satisfaction relation. Based on this notion we provide an institution for observational speci cations. The idea is that the validity of an equational axiom should depend on an observational equality, instead of the usual equality. We show that it is not reasonable to expect an observational equality to be a congruence. We de ne an observational algebra as an algebra equipped with an observational equality which is an equivalence relation but not necessarily a congruence.
Introduction
A main purpose of formal speci cations is to provide a rigorous basis for establishing software correctness. Indeed, it is well known that proving the correctness of some piece of software without any formal reference makes no sense. Algebraic speci cations are widely advocated as being one of the most promising formal speci cation techniques. However, to be provided with some algebraic speci cation is not su cient per se. A precise (and adequate) de nition of software correctness is mandatory. This crucial prerequisite must be rst ful lled before one can develop the relevant veri cation methods, and try to mechanize them. the framework of algebraic speci cations, straightforward de nitions of correctness turn out to be oversimpli ed: most programs that should be considered as being correct (from a practical point of view) are rejected. The rst thing is then to formally de ne the class of algebras which correspond to the correct implementations of a given speci cation. It is well known that this class contains not only all the models of the speci cation but also some algebras which do not satisfy (in the usual sense) all of the axioms of the speci cation. In fact, this class should rather correspond to the algebras which satisfy them \up to observations". For this reason, in our approach, we loosen this too restrictive usual satisfaction relation, in order to obtain an observational satisfaction relation \Oj =", more permissive than \j =" in the sense that Oj= contains j =.
Assume now that the elements of some data type can only be observed via some available observations. In this situation, it is impossible to distinguish some data type elements from the others. This fact can be re ected by an indistinguishability relation, written \ ", de ned on a carrier of an algebra according to the following Indistinguishability Assumption:
Two values are indistinguishable with respect to some observations when it is impossible to establish that they are di erent, using these observations. Now, the idea to loosen the satisfaction relation is to use \ " instead of \=" in the de nition of the satisfaction relation. The usual satisfaction A j = (t = t 0 ) of an equational axiom is based on the set-theoretical equality \=" of the results of the evaluation of both t and t 0 in A, while an observational satisfaction should be based on whether these results are indistinguishable (i.e. related by \ ") or not. Then the crucial point is to de ne the \ " relation, according to the Indistinguishability Assumption. Obviously, such a relation does not coincide with \=". Unlike in 16] , 17] or 10] but similarly to 1] and 5] we want to consider more general observations than sort observation since sort observation does not provide the satisfactory expressive power (as shown in 2]). Unfortunately, an indistinguishability relation de ned w.r.t. such general observations is not a congruence in general (see 5] ). It may even not be an equivalence relation. As a matter of fact, according to the Indistinguishability Assumption, the observations only allow to decide that two elements should be distinct but not to decide that they are equal. We overcome this problem by introducing an observational equality \ =" included in \ ". This leads us to the concept of observational algebras which are of the form hA; =i where A is an algebra (in the usual sense) equipped with an equivalence relation =.
We discuss the conditions which make our formalism provide an institution 8], 9]. A rst obvious condition is to attach the observations to some institution component. Since the observations act on the semantics of a speci cation in the same way as the axioms, we believe that the observations should be attached to the formulae part. Beside observational algebras, we also introduce observational formulae which are of the form h'; Wi with ' a (usual) formula and W a set of observable terms attached to it. In order to de ne an institution in such an approach, we investigate the relations between the variance (translation) of observational formulae and the covariance (\ -reduct") of observational algebras.
In 2], the existing observational techniques have been classi ed in decreasing order of expressive power as follows: formula, atom, term, operation and sort observation. Thus we should justify why we restrict now to term observation, while formula observation is the most powerful. The reason is that it is hard to de ne an indistinguishability relation w.r.t. formula or atom observation and requires a more elaborated framework 14]. In our opinion this is due to the fact that formula and atom observations have no direct meaning at the (imple-menting) software level. On the contrary, observing some chosen terms may be viewed at this level as observing the results of some computations, since the evaluation of an instantiated term clearly corresponds to a computation. This is probably the reason why we did not nd practical examples which would motivate the necessity of formula or atom observations. The approach we develop in this paper attempts to extend the class of the models of an algebraic speci cation by loosening the satisfaction relation. On the other hand there are approaches where this extension is made by means of an equivalence relation Obs on algebras (called behavioural equivalence) depending on some observations Obs. In these approaches, the class of \observational models" (also called behaviours), denoted by Beh SP; Obs], which should correspond to the correct realization of a speci cation SP, is usually de ned in the following way: Even if very general, in our opinion, these approaches do not provide a satisfactory observational semantics. It turns out that in some cases, we know of some realizations that we would like to consider as being correct, but unfortunately these realizations cannot be shown to be behaviourally equivalent to any of the (usual) models of the speci cation at hand. A typical example of such a situation, namely when Alg SP] = , is given in the next section.
A Motivating Example
Let SWC (see Figure 2 .1) be a usual speci cation of sets of natural numbers with an additional operation choose : Set ! Nat, de ned by the axiom s 6 = ) choose(s) 2 s = true.
By this axiom we require choose to return an arbitrary element of an nonempty set. Consider a usual algebra L of lists of natural numbers. Clearly, lists behaves like sets provided that we do not observe them directly but only via the membership operation. For this reason we can consider L as an \observational model" of SWC, choose being realized by car. In this realization the lists nm and mn (with n 6 = m) are observationally equal, since they are viewed as the same set fn; mg. However choose(nm) and choose(mn) produces two Nat values which should not be observationally equal. Accordingly, we should not request the indistinguishability relation to be a congruence. This opens new perspectives in writing speci cations because some inconsistent speci cations (in the usual sense) can be \observationally consistent" provided that the inconsistencies are not observed. This allows some data types to be speci ed in a straightforward way with less risk of introducing unexpected inconsistencies. For instance in Figure 2 .1, sets of natural numbers with an operation enum, which enumerates a set to a list, have been speci ed in a very natural way. Unfortunately this speci cation is inconsistent in the usual sense. Thus in the approaches based on behavioural equivalence, from (1.i), we have Beh SP; Obs] = for any set of observations Obs. On the contrary, in an approach with an observational satisfaction relation this speci cation can have models (sets can be realized by list, enum being the identity), provided that the inconsistencies are not observed (i.e. the terms in which enum occurs are not observable). Notice by the way that sort observation is not su cient in this case.
As a summary we state the following claims:
1. An observational equality depends on observations. Since they are proper to a data type, each data type owns its proper observational equality.
spec : SWE use : LIST, NAT, BOOL sort : Set generated by :
: ! Set ins: Nat Set ! Set operations :
2 : Nat Set ! Bool del : Nat Set ! Set enum : Set ! List axioms :
1 : ins(x,ins(x,s)) = ins(x,s) 2 : ins(x,ins(y,s)) = ins(y,ins(x,s)) 3 : del(x, ) = 4 : del(x,ins(x,s)) = del(x,s) 5 : x 6 = y ) del(x,ins(y,s)) = ins(y,del(x,s)) 6 : x 2 = false 7 : x 2 ins(x,s) = true 8 : x 6 = y ) x 2 ins(y,s) = x 2 s 9 : enum( ) = nil 10 : enum(ins(x,s)) = cons(x,enum(s)) spec : SWC use : NAT, BOOL sort : Set generated by :
2 : Nat Set ! Bool del : Nat Set ! Set choose : Set ! Nat axioms :
ins(x,ins(x,s)) = ins(x,s) ins(x,ins(y,s)) = ins(y,ins(x,s)) del(x, ) = del(x,ins(x,s)) = del(x,s) x 6 = y ) del(x,ins(y,s)) = ins(y,del(x,s)) x 2 = false x 2 ins(x,s) = true x 6 = y ) x 2 ins(y,s) = x 2 s s 6 = ) choose(s) 2 s = true 2. The operations do not necessarily preserve observational equalities (i.e. \ " is not necessarily a congruence). 3. Two distinguishable elements cannot be equal. Two indistinguishable elements are not necessarily equal.
Basic De nitions
We assume that the reader is familiar with algebraic speci cations (see e.g. 7] or 11]).
A signature consists of a nite set S of sort symbols and a nite set of operation names with arities ambiguously denoted by . We assume that each signature is provided with an S-sorted set of variables X such that X s is countable for each s 2 S. We use the following conventions. Given a signature (resp. 0 ), S (resp. S 0 ) denotes the sorts of (resp. of 0 ) and X (resp. X 0 ) denotes the variables of (resp. of 0 ). A signature morphism : ! 0 maps each sort of S to a sort of S 0 , each operation (f : s 1 : : : s n ! s) 2 to an operation (f) of 0 with the arity (s 1 ) : : : (s n ) ! (s) and each variable of X s to a variable of X 0 (s) .
Moreover, we assume that a signature morphism is always injective on variables 1 . Signatures with signature morphisms form the usual category of signatures, written Sig.
From T (X), the \=" symbol, connectives (:, _,^, ), etc.) and quanti ers (8, 9) we construct the set W ] of well formed -formulae. The de nition of (total) -algebras and -morphisms is the standard one, as well as the satisfaction relation between -algebras and -formulae. The category of all -algebras is denoted by Alg ]. Given an S-sorted set E, we denote by T (E) the free -algebra over E. For instance T (resp. T (X)) denotes the -algebra of ground terms (resp. terms with variables), T (A) (resp. T (A X)) denotes the -algebra of ground terms (resp. terms with variables) over the carriers of a -algebra A. Given a signature morphism : ! 0 the -reduct of a 0 -algebra A 0 , written A 0 j is de ned in the usual way and extending it on 0 -morphisms we obtain the forgetful functor j : Alg 0 ] ! Alg ]. In the particular case of an inclusion 0 , the corresponding forgetful functor is written j .
A valuation is a morphism : X ! A which maps each x 2 X s to a value x 2 A s . The set of all valuations from X to A is written Val X;A]. A partial valuation is a valuation preceded by an inclusion X 0 X. From the freeness of T (X) any valuation (resp. partial valuation) followed by the inclusion A T (A) (resp. A T (A X)) extends to a unique morphism (written ambiguously ) from T (X) to T (A) (resp. T (A X)) which maps each term t 2 (T (X)) s to a valued term t 2 (T (A)) s (resp. partially valued term t 2 (T (A X)) s ). The evaluation morphism from T (A) to A is de ned as the unique -morphism which maps each element of (T (A)) s \ A s to itself. This morphism maps a valued term to its evaluation result written .
A position p in a term t is a sequence of integers which describe the path from the topmost position of t (denoted by the empty sequence) to the subterm of t at position p written tj p . The set of all the positions of t is denoted by Pos(t). The replacement of tj p by a term r in t is written t r] p . The multiple replacement at parallel positions p 1 ; : : : ; p n is written t r 1 : : : r n ] p1:::pn .
De nition 3.1
Given sorts S = fs 1 ; : : : ; s n g the set of contextual variables is the (S-indexed) set = f s 1 ; : : : sn g with f s i g called the contextual variable of sort s i . A multicontext (resp. context) over a -algebra A is a partially valued term with only one (resp. only one occurrence of a) contextual variable. Consequently, the set of all multicontexts over A, written MC (A) (the set of all contexts over A is written C (A)) is de ned as follows:
T (A f s g) Given ! 0 be a signature morphism, A 0 be a 0 -algebra. We de ne Notice that this de nition makes sense, since and A 0 are well de ned. The notation 0 j suggests that the relation j de ned on the valuations by Equation (3.i) 
It is a trivial consequence of Lemma 3.6 since can always be written t 0 j with t 2 T (X) and 0 : X 0 ! A 0 (c.f. Lemma 3.5). 2 
How to Observe and How to Compare
As mentioned in the introduction we need to de ne an indistinguishability relation on the carriers of an algebra in order to relax the satisfaction relation. Usually this is done using the concept of observable contexts. Since this concept was only de ned for sort ( 10] Our rst version of the de nition of observable contexts has also another drawback: the entire carriers of some sorts can be, in an unreasonable way, devoid of observable context, as in the case of the speci cation PASS-BY (c.f. Figure 4. 3). Here the elements of A Hidden have no observable contexts in any algebra A. Thus they are all indistinguishable. Consequently, the algebras with the carrier of Hidden reduced to a singleton should be present among the observational models of PASS-BY. However, this could prevent from preserving the observable properties of Nat. In fact, the speci cation PASS-BY requires all reachable elements of Nat to spec : PASS-BY sort : Nat, Hidden, Visible generated by : stage-two(stage-one(succ i (0))) 6 = stage-two(stage-one(succ j (0))) for i 6 = j should hold in any observational model. Of course, this is impossible when the carrier of Hidden is a singleton. We conclude that in the above example we should consider stage-two( ) as an observable context of any element which is reachable by the evaluation of stage-one(x) properly instantiated.
The examples PASS-BY and AD-HOC suggest that a better version of the de nition of observable contexts should somehow take into account the super-terms of observable terms as well as their partial evaluations. Before to state this version, we need some reminders about partial evaluation.
De nition 4.3
Let A be a -algebra. We de ne the partial evaluation relation, written ! pEv , on T (A) as follows. We say that a term 2 2 T (A) is the result of the partial evaluation of 1 We illustrate the concepts introduced so far by means of the speci cation SWE (see where LIST is the identity morphism and
Consider the Sig LIST]-algebra L being the usual realization of lists. Then the Sig SWE]-algebra we are interested in is L j . The continuations of l 2 (L j ) List are the following ones: We would like to propose an institution for observational speci cations. Since our observational satisfaction relation (which will be de ned further) strongly depends on continuations, we must rst study their properties w.r.t. the forgetful functor and the translation of observable terms. In this way, we are going to provide tools which will be useful to show that the satisfaction condition holds in our formalism. Below we give the rst important theorem. It is a good opportunity to establish some interesting lemmas about partial evaluation. 
It is clear that for any 0 -algebra A 0 , f 2 ( ) is not a W-continuation via any element a 2 A 0 j , whereas (f 2 ( )) = f 0 ( ) 2 cont (W) ( A 0 (a)).
However, for injective signature morphisms the converse of Theorem 4.9 holds: Theorem 4.14 Let : ! 0 be an injective signature morphism, W T (X) be a set of terms and A 0 be a 0 -algebra. For any a 2 A 0 j and any 2 MC (A 0 j ) we have:
Since is injective, A 0 is too. Then, for W 0 = (W), the implications in lemmas 4.10, 4.11, 4.12 become equivalences. Consequently, we obtain the proof we are looking for, by replacing the implications in the proof of 4.9 by equivalences. 2 5 Properties of the Indistinguishability Relation
The de nition 4.2 express in which situations two elements of a -algebra are indistinguishable. Indeed, it de nes an S-sorted relation W = ( W ) s2S on an algebra, called the indistinguishability relation. Since this relation is the next step toward a complete description of our institution for observational speci cations, we must study its properties w.r.t. the forgetful functor and the translation of observable terms. This will be necessary for establishing the satisfaction condition (see 9]) in a further section. After the following proposition devoted to this aim, we study other interesting properties of the indistinguishability relation. (iv) Now, from Theorem 4.9 we know that A 0 ( ) is an element of cont W 0 (a 0 ) (resp. cont W 0 (b 0 )). Accordingly, it is a comparator of a 0 and b 0 and by (iv) it distinguishes a 0 and b 0 . This is in contradiction with the starting hypothesis.
2 As a corollary of this proposition, we have the following fact which makes clear the decreasing character of the indistinguishability relation w.r.t. the inclusion sets of observable terms. 
Proof
It is enough to consider the previous proposition with = 0 , W = W 1 , W 0 = W 2 and the identity.
2 The following fact is obvious from the de nition of the indistinguishability relation.
Fact 5.3
The indistinguishability relation is re exive and symmetric.
2
The next fact fully agrees with our claims:
The indistinguishability relation is not a congruence in general.
Proof
It is enough to go back to Example 4. The reason is that we did not impose any restriction on the set of observable terms. Consequently, nothing ensures that all the elements of a given data type can be observed in the same way. In the algebra A each of the elements a A , b A , c A is observed di erently, each pair among this elements is compared in some proper way, di erent from the others. This is the reason why the indistinguishability relation is not transitive. In fact, this surprising property results directly from our Indistinguishability Assumption according to which we have built de nitions 4.2, 4.6 and 4.7. However, when all the elements of a given carrier of an algebra have the same continuations, the indistinguishability relation is transitive: Fact 5.6
Let A be a -algebra and W be a set of -terms. Fact 5.6 provides a semantical transitivity criterion of the indistinguishability relation. There exist also some syntactical criteria. We describe them in the next section.
A Particular Case of Term Observation
An interesting case arises when the set of observable terms is described by a partial subsignature de ned precisely by the following de nition:
De nition 6.1
Let be a signature. A partial subsignature of (partial signature for short) is a pair hS 1 ; 0 i such that 0 is a subsignature of and S 1 is a subset of sorts of 0 . The set of terms T hS 1 ; 0 i (X) of a partial signature hS 1 ; 0 i (the set of hS 1 ; 0 i-terms) is de ned as follows:
This kind of sets of terms is interesting because the indistinguishability relation generated by such a set is transitive on any algebra. In order to make this point clear, we rst introduce an auxiliary de nition of hS 1 ; 0 i-indistinguishability. This is a transitive relation. We show then that this relation is the same that the T hS 1 ; 0 i (X)-indistinguishability (in the sense of De nition 4.2). This last result allows to conclude that any T hS 1 ; 0 i (X)-indistinguishability is transitive on all -algebras. Partial signatures are used as observations in 1]. Observational equality w.r.t. hS 1 ; 0 i de ned in this paper coincides with our hS 1 ; 0 i-indistinguishability on all reachable algebras. However these two relations do not coincide on non reachable algebras, not even on their reachable parts. If two elements are hS 1 ; 0 i-indistinguishable then they are also observationally equal w.r.t. hS 1 ; 0 i (in the sense of 1]) but the converse is true only for reachable algebras. This is due to the fact that our comparators are elements of MC (A) while these used in 1] can be viewed as elements of MC . Since MC MC (A) we have more possibilities than 1] to distinguish two elements.
Observational Algebras
In Section 5 we have shown that the indistinguishability relation is not transitive in general. For this reason, an observational satisfaction relation cannot be directly based on the indistinguishability relation in contrast with the usual satisfaction relation based on the usual equality (of the elements of an algebra). Its non-transitive character (see 5.5) would make impossible the replacement of equals by equals. On the contrary, the non-congruence property (see 5.4) does not reject this possibility, provided that such exotic operations as enum (see Figure 2 .1) are treated with care. For instance in some term t of SWE we can replace its subterm tj p = ins(s(0); ins(0; )) by ins(0; ins(s(0); )) except when there is some enum in t over the position p. 1 In addition we believe that there is no reason to expect an \observational equality" to be a congruence (as in 5]). This happens only in a particular case of sort observation (see 10], 16]).
We can conclude that at this moment the only problem is due to the non-transitive character of the indistinguishability relation. For this reason, we introduce in this section the notion of observational equality which, being transitive, is a step toward an observational satisfaction relation.
At the end of Section 2 we have stated some claims as the result of the former discussion. They lead us now to the following conclusions:
Because of the second claim, an observational equality cannot be a congruence for the same reason that the indistinguishability relation is not (c.f. 5.4). The last claim suggests that on a given algebra, an observational equality is not unique. The rst claim suggests that observational equality should be an S-sorted relation. Putting these conclusions together, we state the following de nition:
De nition 7.1 Given a signature , an observational -algebra is a pair \hA; =i" where A is a -algebra and = is an S-sorted equivalence relation on A, called observational equality on A. We note OAlg ] the class of all observational -algebras.
Notice that:
A -algebra A can be considered in a straightforward way as an observational -algebra hA; =i.
In general we can form an in nity of observational algebras from a -algebra. For this reason we use the notation = or = in order to distinguish between two relations which can form two observational algebras hA; = i and hA; = i from a given algebra A.
The reader certainly realizes that our de nition of observational algebras is similar to the one of structures in First Order Logic where each predicate symbol is interpreted by a relation. We consider the equality symbol \=" in the axioms as a particular predicate symbol. This symbol is explicitly interpreted in an algebra by a particular relation, namely an observational equality. Since all the connectives of the classical logic as well as the existential quanti er can be expressed by means of :,^and 8, the solutions of an arbitrary rst order logic -formula (without predicate symbols) are well de ned by the above de nition.
Before to put our formalism in an institutional framework we need to investigate the relationship between the solutions across the forgetful functor and the translation of formulae. This is done in the following theorem: Theorem 8. is equivalent to (ii). Consequently, it is enough to prove the equivalence between (iii) and (iv). (ii)
Proof
Notice rst that the subformula y 0 0 j = y 0 0 j of (i) is equivalent to A 0 (y 0 0 j ) = A 0 (y 0 0 j ) since A 0 is injective, when restricted to the carrier of a given sort. By de nition 3.4 the last equation is equivalent to (y) 0 = (y) 0 . We can therefore replace the left hand side of the implication in (i) by 8 y 2 X c fxg (y) 0 = (y) 0 . Since is injective on variables we can change the quanti cation domain and variable in order to obtain an equivalent formula: De nition 8.8
An observational -formula is a pair h'; Wi where ' 2 W ] is a -formula and W T (X) is a set of terms. We note OW ] the set of all observational -formulae.
As in the usual framework, OW is extended to a functor from the category of signatures Sig to Set (the category of sets). This functor maps an objet of Sig to the set of all observational -formulae. An arrow of Sig( ; 0 ) is mapped by OW to the cartesian product of its usual extensions on W ] and T (X). In other words:
OW ](h'; Wi) = h ('); (W)i (We write ambiguously instead of OW ].)
We have already all the elements necessary to de ne an observational satisfaction relation:
De nition 8.9
We say that an observational -algebra hA; =i satis es an observational formula h ; Wi, written hA, =i Oj= h ,Wi, i :
Notice that in the above we have de ned a family of relations fOj = g :Sig with
Oj= OAlg ] OW ]
We examine now how our satisfaction relation behaves w.r.t. the variance of observational formulae (translation) and the covariance of algebras ( -reduct). We start by the rst requirement of De nition 8.9: Proposition 8.10
Let : ! 0 be a signature morphism. For any set of terms W T (X), any observational 0 -algebra hA 0 ; = 0 i and any -formula ' we have: The next step is to study the second condition of De nition 8.9 w.r.t. term translation and forgetful functor. We examine rst the if part and then the converse part of this condition. From this negative result we may already conclude that, in order to establish institutions within our approach, we will be constrained to restrict somehow our formalism. This will be the subject of Section 10.
Observational Speci cations
This section is devoted to some general notions about observational speci cations.
De nition 9.1
An observational speci cation OSP is a triplet h ; ; Wi, where is the signature of OSP, the set of its axioms and W is a set of terms with variables, W T (X), called observations of OSP.
The models are de ned as in the usual approach except that we use the observational satisfaction instead of the usual one:
De nition 9.2 Let OSP = h ; ; Wi be an observational speci cation. We say that an observational -algebra hA; =i is a model of OSP i :
hA; =i Oj= h ; Wi We note OAlg OSP] the class of all observational models of OSP. In the above de nition we have considered a set = f' 1 ; : : : ; ' n g of formulae as a conjunction of formulae = ' 1^: : :^' n . Thus any pair h ; Wi can be viewed as a single observational formula. One may also de ne an observational speci cation as a pair h ; OAxi with OAx = fh 1 ; W 1 i; : : : ; h i ; W i i; : : :g. The possibility to associate observations separately to each axiom would increase the expressive power. (In particular, it allows an in nite set OAx.) However, in all examples it seems preferable to attach a unique set of observable terms to the whole speci cation.
Fact 9.3
The observational algebra hL j ; Obs SWE i, described in Example 7.2, is a model of the observational speci cation SWE.
Proof
Since the observational equality on hL j ; Obs SWE i is just the indistinguishability relation, we only need to prove that for any axiom of SWE (This is quite analogous to the nal data type of 13].) Notice that when W is not transitive this category has often no terminal object. For instance the category of observational models of TRANS formed with the algebra A (see Figure 5 .1) has no terminal object.
The next result points out that our observational speci cations together with their semantics generalize the usual approach. On one hand an algebra A can be viewed as the observational algebra hA; =i. On the other hand, an algebraic speci cation h ; i can be considered as an observational one in the straightforward way: we just take h ; ; Xi. The relationship between the both is stated by the following proposition: Proposition 9. Up to now, we have not been studying modularity issues. We have only de ned the semantics of \ at" speci cations. In fact, as in 1], our semantics extends to an observational strati ed loose semantics without additional assumptions. For instance, the next theorem shows that our approach ful lls the requirement of \reusing by restriction" 4]. Proof of (ii) follows directly from Proposition 8.11.
2 This result corresponds to a very fundamental property which holds in most non observational frameworks. Except for our case, in the approaches with an observational satisfaction relation the corresponding property holds only for equational speci cations. It may also hold for positive-conditional axioms under the hypothesis of observable preconditions. However, this is a rather strong restriction. It may be then surprising that in our approach the former theorem holds without restriction even if the axioms are arbitrary rst order formulae. The reason is that our observational equality is not xed by observations as the indistinguishability relation does. Unlike 1], 5], 10], 16] and 17], our observational equality does not coincide with the indistinguishability relation. This choice was dictated by the fact that the indistinguishability relation is \disconnected" from the forgetful functor. On the contrary, our observational equality, similarly to the usual equality, is always \transported" through the forgetful functor. The main di erence of our approach with the above-mentioned works is that our satisfaction relation is based on an observational equality which does not coincide with the indistinguishability relation. This situation (partly) guarantees such a general result as Theorem 9.5.
The following corollary of the former theorem formalizes the phenomenon: \more observations, less models". 
Follows directly from the previous theorem. 2 We conclude from the above that observations acts on the semantics of a speci cation in a quite similar way than the axioms, since by adding axioms, we diminish the class of the models.
Towards an Institution of Observational Speci cations
In this section, based on the formalism we have developed so far, we de ne an institution for observational speci cations. As mentioned in Section 8, this task requires to put some restrictions on our general formalism.
Recall that an institution (see 9]) is a tuple hSign; W ; Mod; j = i where 1. Sign is a category of \signatures", 2. W : Sign ! Set is a functor which maps a signature to the set of well formed formulae over the signature, We can conclude from the above that in our approach, the satisfaction condition does not hold in general. Only the if part of Property 10.1 holds. Consequently, according to 18], our approach de nes a reduction-preserving pre-institution. The converse part of 10.1 holds only for these signature morphisms and these observations which preserve 10.2. Consequently our approach could motivate more liberal formalizations than institutions of the notion of \logical system" as e.g. speci cation logic 6] or pre-institutions 18].
Since the satisfaction condition holds only for some signature morphisms, in order to de ne an institution in our framework, one could forget some problematic arrows of Sig and consider as a category of signatures a category which has the same objects as Sig but less arrows. We retain this last solution. Then the question is which signature morphisms we should eliminate in order to obtain an institution. It is easy to see that examples similar to 8.12 can be constructed as soon as we have a non injective signature morphism. We conclude that an observational institution can be provided within our formalism under a restriction of the arrows of Sig to injective morphisms only. Proposition 10.4 Consider the tuple OAlgSpec = hISig; OW ; OAlg; Oj=i where ISig is the category whose objects are the usual signatures and whose arrows are the injective signature morphisms. Then OAlgSpec is an institution.
Proof
According to the discussion of this section, it is enough to prove that Property 10.2 holds for injective signature morphisms. Accordingly, OAlgSpec is in some sense \parameterized" by W . Recall that our approach does not take into account predicate symbols (other than =). Thus the W functors acceptable for our purposes must send signatures to any subset of the Many-Sorted First Order Logic with Equality without predicate symbols. Moreover, our approach can be easily enriched with predicate symbols without loss of the results (as shown in 14]).
Some Additional Examples
In this section we show on two examples how some (usual) algebraic speci cation h ; i can be completed with observations W, in order to get some interesting observational models corresponding to bounded realizations. Of course the examples of models we provide are only in OAlg h ; ; Wi] and not in Alg h ; i]. This motivates the use of an observational approach to handle bounded implementations of speci cations which (in the usual sense) have no bounded models. In both examples we proceed as follows:
1. Given a speci cation h ; i we provide a -algebra A which is not a model of h ; i. 2. We equip A with an observational equivalence = and we show that hA; =i ful lls the rst requirement of the de nition of our observational satisfaction relation 8.9, that is ] hA; =i = Val X; A] for all 2 .
3. We give an appropriate set of observations W and we show that the second requirement of the de nition of our satisfaction relation holds, that is = W .
As a rst example consider the speci cation INT= h 1 ; 1 i of integers (see Figure 11 .1).
The only reachable models of this speci cation are ZZ Obviously, this algebra is not a model of INT. Let us equip A with the observational equality \ =" de ned as the re exive-symmetrictransitive closure of the relation fhminint; under owi; hmaxint; over owig It is easy to show that Val X; A] is the set of solutions of both axioms of INT in hA; =i.
Assume now that we observe the set W 1 of all the ground terms which denote integers between minint and maxint. In this situation the contextual variable Int is a continuation of all the elements of A between minint and maxint. On the contrary, under ow and over ow have no continuations. Consequently W 1 = f hb; bi; hc; di j b; c; d 2 A Int ; fc; dg \ funder ow; over owg 6 = g Hence = W 1 and we conclude that hA; =i is an observational model of h 1 ; 1 ; W 1 i.
As a second example, we are going to study bounded stacks. Consider the speci cation STACK= h 2 ; 2 i (see Figure 11 .1) and assume that we are only interested in stacks of a height bounded by a constant maxheight. Then the following algebra should be correct for our purposes: we consider an array-pointer realization with an array of length maxheight+1 starting at the index 0. A full stack is then represented by the couple ht; maxheighti and an erroneous stack by ht; s(maxheight)i (s(maxheight) points outside of t). For both erroneous and correct stacks, the operation top is always realized in the standard way: It is important to notice that it is impossible in this realization to make correct an erroneous stack by means of combinations of pushes and pops only.
Let A be the above realization. We equip now the algebra A with the observational equality \ =" de ned as a the re exive-symmetric-transitive closure of the following relation \ "
In this way we have shown that in hA; =i, the solutions of both axioms of STACK are Val X; A].
Assume now that we observe the set W 2 of all the ground terms of the form top(t) with t generated by emptystack, push and pop and representing a stack of height least or equal to and we have shown that hA; =i is an observational model of the speci cation h 2 ; 2 ; W 2 i.
The reader have certainly realized that in both examples the corresponding observations have been described in an informal way. In fact in this work we did not deal with a syntax for describing sets of observable terms. It is clear that no syntax may exist allowing to describe (in a nite way) an arbitrary subset of T (X). 1 Consequently the choice of a particular syntax will impose strong restrictions on possible observations. Nevertheless, under such restrictions, we can expect some additional results within this framework.
Concluding Remarks
We have developed a loose observational semantics of algebraic speci cations. We have shown that, under some restrictions, our formalism provides an institution. First, we have investigated how the elements of a carrier of an algebra should be observed through terms. We have pointed out that an adequate notion of observation requires to take into account multicontexts and partial evaluations of observable terms. In this way, we have introduced the concept of continuation underlying our de nition of the indistinguishability relation. We have shown that this relation is neither a congruence nor an equivalence relation. These both results fully agree with our Indistinguishability Assumption. Notice that when we restrict to sort observation, our indistinguishability relation becomes a congruence. Consequently, this notion becomes close to the Nerode congruence 10]. However, unlike in 16], in our approach two observational algebras di ering on non observable junk do not satisfy the same observational formulae. We do not privilege reachable elements, since this is most suitable for the observational semantics of parameterized speci cations in the loose framework (which is one of the topics of further research). Moreover, one might think that our indistinguishability relation would coincide with the Reichel's I-indistinguishability (see 17]) when we restrict our approach to sort observation and the Reichel's one to total algebras. This is not true, since we use multicontexts from MC (A) instead of MC . Consequently, in our approach, non observable junk can a ect the indistinguishability of two elements of a carrier of an algebra while it cannot in other works with observational satisfaction relation. Thus he have fully followed our claim not to privilege reachable elements.
Being convinced that the possibility of replacements of equal by equal must be allowed, we have introduced in our semantics an additional stage over the indistinguishability relation, namely observational equality. Then we have de ned the observational algebras, the observational formulae and the corresponding satisfaction relation. We have shown that the restriction to injective signature morphisms is a reasonably weak condition which enables our formalism to be extended to an institution.
